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Abstract: Operational decisions made by manufacturers and retailers are often affected by the 
power relationships of both vertical and horizontal competitions in a supply chain. Although 
many studies have been carried to assess how the power structure impacts supply chains, most 
of them only focus on the power dynamics in the vertical competition or horizontal 
competition. This paper systematically examines the impacts of bi-dimensional power structure 
on a supply chain. Considering a triadic setting that is made of two rival retailers and a 
common manufacturer, we compare the equilibriums for the supply chain and individual firms 
with five different possible power structures. The analysis results show that the bi-dimensional 
power dynamics have a significant impact. Furthermore, the impacts of the bi-dimensional 
power structure are also dependent on the nature of customer demand. This work provides 
important management implications that are supportive for companies to make strategic and 
operational decisions. 
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Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION 
Operations decisions on inventory, pricing and orders made by manufacturers and retailers are 
usually influenced by their relative power against parallel competitors and their customers or 
suppliers. In most cases, a dominant position over other counterparties enables companies to 
drive through their strategic agenda throughout the supply chain and, more often, positions the 
dominant players in a driving force in negotiating contracts [6], [10], [42]. As Fang et al. [20] 
revealed in their research that while addressing its own priorities, channel leader’s actions in 
price setting can lead to the profit gain that is significant for each channel member. Using the 
food retail supply chains as an example, supermarkets, often regarded as the supply chain 
leader [12], [42], are the powerful player. Their powerful position in the supply chain enables 
them to push down wholesale prices when negotiating contract with their suppliers. When 
consumers may enjoy the low retail prices of food products, small producers and farms feel the 
pains of the squeezed profit margin. This is highlighted by the recent dispute in milk prices 
between the major supermarket chains and small diary producers in the UK and France. In 
contrast, the dynamics in these negotiations may change if the food producers increase their 
supply chain power. This is mirrored by the recent price battle in 2016 between TESCO, the 
largest supermarket in the UK in terms of market share, and Unilever, UK's biggest grocery 
manufacturer. The dispute between the two players escalated and went public as both players 
refused to back down initially, which resulted in availability issues for many Unilever products 
on supermarket shelves. Although the price dispute ended eventually as both parties took 
compromise to reach a resolution, it clearly shows the significance of supply chain power 
relationship in negotiating wholesale prices as well as setting up the retail prices.  
    It is critical for business managers to understand properly the power relationships existing 
in the supply chains to manage supply chains effectively and efficiently [16]. Although the 
existing literature have looked at issues including market power [1], [5], [30], [32], channel 
power [27], [35], [36], and supply chain power [3], [9], [16], [17], [18], [42], often only 
one-dimensional power structure, either horizontally between rival firms or vertically between 
supply chain parties, is considered in these studies to examine its impact on firms’ operational 
decisions and their performances. Therefore, this research investigates the following questions: 
3 
 How does the power relationship in the vertical and horizontal competitions affect the 
supply chain decisions? 
 To what extent, the bi-dimensional power structure makes impact on the performances 
of the supply chain and individual firms?  
    To address these questions, we take into consideration both vertical and horizontal 
competitions a triadic supply network that consists of a common manufacturer and two 
retailers [14]. Five different supply chain power structures are analytically modelled using 
non-cooperative game theory with a focus on the interaction of supply chain firms. The 
different power structures are characterized by the different orders of event sequence, in which, 
the equilibrium are derived for both the manufacturer and the two retailers [10], [24]. Through 
the comparison of optimal supply chain decisions (e.g. prices and quantities) and profits 
derived in each game model, our research systematically examines the impacts of 
bi-dimensional power structure on the supply chain. Our analysis leads to many interesting 
insights.  
    This paper intends to make several contributions. First, our research complements to the 
existing literature on supply chain power relationship by incorporating both horizontal and 
vertical power relationships in the examination of their impact on the supply chain. It is one of 
few studies [29], [44] that have considered the bi-dimensional power structure in such an 
investigation. Second, using a realistic setting of the models, our analysis also reveals some 
novel insights that are not captured by other studies as well as reinforcing some views of 
supply chain relationship in the existing literature. These insights give us a better 
understanding of how supply chain firms set up prices in relation to their relevant power 
positions in the supply chain. It also provides important managerial insights that are valuable 
for firms in making critical strategic and operational decisions in order to enhance their 
competitiveness.       
The remaining of the article is organized as below. It is started by presenting the 
theoretical grounding to our study through the review of relevant literature in Section Ⅱ. The 
model description and assumptions are then provided in Section Ⅲ. The equilibriums under 
various supply chain power structures are presented in Section Ⅳ. After that, the effects of 
vertical power relationship, horizontal power relationship, and potential market size are 
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discussed in Section Ⅴ. In Section Ⅵ, numerical examples are presented to obtain additional 
managerial insights. Finally, we draw our conclusions by discussing our main research findings 
and research contributions, and avenues for future research.       
 
Ⅱ. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The influence of power relationships on firms’ strategic and operational decisions is an 
important research area. This section reviews several streams of literature that are particularly 
relevant.  
Studies on the impact of market power dynamics on companies’ decisions and 
performances have been reported substantially in the economics, operations, marketing 
literature. Moorthy [31] examined two identical firms competing on product pricing and quality. 
The study obtains the equilibrium strategy for each firm and finds that the firm should be 
differentiating its product from its competitor. Banker et al. [2] investigated the effect of 
competitive intensity on the equilibrium levels of quality and their study found that the 
relationship between quality and competitive intensity depends on the increased competition 
and other parameters. Van Mieghem and Dada [43], in their study of the value of various forms 
of postponement, developed a single period model for retailers offering a homogeneous good. 
Their analysis result shows how horizontal competition, the timing of operational decisions, 
and uncertainty affect firm’s strategic investment decision and its value. Hall and Porteus [25] 
developed a dynamic model of firm behaviour, in which, customer service is a key competition 
factor, and studied firm’s capacity decisions in respond to customer service and competition 
pressure. So [37] analysed the individual firms’ optimization problem and then studied the 
equilibrium solution in a competition involving multiple firms with an assumption of price and 
delivery time sensitive customer demand. Tsay and Agrawal [41] studied two independent 
retailers who compete for consumers directly using retail price and service. Nevo [32] found in 
his study on the ready-to-eat cereal industry that powerful firms gain high price-cost margins 
by their ability in maintaining a portfolio of differentiated products and influencing the 
perceived product quality when competing with their rival firms. The above mentioned studies 
mainly focus on the horizontal competition between rival firms and investigate the influences 
of the power dynamics in the marketplace on the firms’ decisions and financial performances. 
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Nevertheless, business competition is no longer the competition between individual firms but 
the competition between supply chains. Therefore, the interactions between different supply 
chain members and their power relationships have to be considered.    
    One relevant stream of literature deals with the impact of supply chain power 
relationships on operational decisions and performances. Among them Choi [13] investigated 
the impact of power structure on the operational decisions of a common retailer channel. Ertek 
and Griffin [19] looked at its impact on price, profits and the market sensitivity towards the 
price through analyzing the cases where the buyer or the supplier has superior bargaining 
power over its counterparty. Using game theory approach, Cai et al. [7] incorporated various 
power structures in the analysis of the effect of various pricing schemes on the supply chain 
with dual-channel competition. Similarly, taking power structure into a consideration, Zhang et 
al. [46] examined the impact of products’ substitutability and channel position on pricing 
decision in two dual-exclusive channels from the game theoretical perspective. They found that 
the supply chain performs best in a balanced power structure. Using game theoretical approach, 
Shi et al. [39] examined the impacts of three different power structures on supply chains with 
price-dependent random demand. Their study shows that power structure makes impact on the 
efficiency of the supply chain and the impact is dependent on both expected demand and 
demand shock. Grennan [23] empirically analyzed the relationship between power dynamics, 
more specifically, firms’ bargaining ability and competitive advantage in the context of 
hospitals and medical device supplier. His findings indicate that the variation in purchasing 
prices of the same device is mainly due to the difference in bargaining ability. In their study on 
managing imbalanced relationship for the supply chain sustainability, Touboulic et al. [42] 
shows the impact of power relationship on how individual members manage their supply chain 
relationships and the consequential impact of organizational response on the sustainability 
implementation. Chen and Wang [10] studied the optimal strategic choice between free and 
bundled channels in the context of the mobile phone sector from the perspective of power 
relationship. Using a similar approach, Chen et al. [9] examined the effect of power structure 
on the decision and performance of an online-to-offline retail service supply chain. 
Furthermore, Chen et al. [11] explore the role of power relationship in coordinating the supply 
chain with a goal of improving both environmental and economics performances. However, the 
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above mentioned studies mainly concentrate on the vertical power relationships between 
manufacturers and their downstream customers or between manufacturers and their upstream 
suppliers. In fact, while the vertical power relationships affect firms’ strategic and operational 
decisions, their decisions and performances are also subject to the market power relationships 
with their rival competitors.   
    Another relevant research stream is the study on supply chain performance using different 
power relationships between involved supply chain members. Ingene and Parry [26] 
investigated a two-part tariff problem through a monopoly manufacturer channel, which 
includes multi-retailer model with one manufacturer. Their results show that the optimal tariff 
from the monopoly manufacturer channel model can be more profitable than that from dyadic 
models. Choi [14] used a duopoly common retailer channel to model price competition. He 
indicates that the most common channel structure that includes multiple common retailers and 
manufacturers. The research findings show that while the horizontal product differentiation is 
beneficial to manufacturers, it is harmful to retailers. In contrast, horizontal store 
differentiation is beneficial to retailers but manufacturers are worse off. Considering a 
two-echelon supply network with one single supplier providing service to a number of rival 
retailers, Bernstein and Federgruen [4] examined the equilibrium behaviour of decentralized 
supply chains under uncertain demand. Netessine and Shumsky [34] investigated how the 
airline seat inventory decisions are affected by vertical and horizontal competition respectively 
in the airline industry, and discussed revenue-sharing contracts that coordinate these decisions. 
Their study considers the power structure in the horizontal competition but not in the vertical 
competition. More recently, in a triadic supply network with an unbalanced power relation, 
Geylani et al. [21] developed a theoretical model to demonstrate how a manufacturer responses 
strategically to the dominant retailer. Cai [8] examined the impact of channel coordination on 
supply chain performance through a comparison of four different supply chain structures. In his 
study, the revenue sharing contract is utilized to show that negotiation power between the 
channel members differs over different supply chain structures. Taking in consideration of 
different channel power structures, Pan et al. [36] examined different contract strategies in a 
triadic supply chain network. Guo and Iyer [22] analyzed multilateral bargaining in a supply 
network that consists of two rival retailers and a common manufacturer. In their study, the 
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effects of the timing of negotiations on the bargaining externality across the retailers and the 
price competition are investigated. In examination of return polity for the fashion supply chain, 
Li et al. [28] looked at the similarities and differences in the structural properties between the 
supply chains that produce the conventional newsvendor type of products and the fast fashion 
type of products. Although the above mentioned studies considered supply chain power 
relationships in either the monopoly common retailer channel or the monopoly manufacturer 
channel, only one dimensional power relationship (either vertical or horizontal) is considered 
when examining the effects of different power relationships on firms’ decisions and their 
performances.  
As far as our understanding, Wu et al. [44] is among the few studies that investigated a 
similar research problem taking in consideration both the horizontal and vertical power 
structures. However, one power structure scenario considered in the study, where there is a 
Stackelberg game in horizontal competition between two retailers but the vertical competition 
between the supplier and each retailer is Bertrand competition, (in which, the two firms move 
simultaneously), is not logical. Stackelberg and Bertrand or Nash games are often adopted in 
the supply chain research to characterize different power structures, which is differentiated by 
the sequence of actions of involved firms [10], [33], [39]. Considering the power relationship 
in a triad, it does not make sense while there is an asymmetric power relationship between the 
two players, and at the same time, they also have symmetric power with the 3rd player in the 
triad. In addition, when modelling the decision sequence in their game models, the supplier 
announces the advanced and normal wholesale prices to retailers respectively. Such a setting is 
conducive to arbitrage in the market and may be harmful to a fair competition. In contrast, in 
our models, the manufacturer announces the same wholesale price to retailers, which is a more 
common industrial practice. Since the manufacturer supplies the same product to the two 
retailers and quantity discount is not applied in the model, it is fairer and more reasonable to 
announce the same whole price to the two retailers. More importantly, although the comparison 
of equilibrium profits and quantities among the game model was made, their analysis does not 
reveal the effect of both horizontal and vertical competitions and the power dynamics have on 
the manufacturer and the retailers’ optimal decisions and their performances, which is this 
study’s main purpose. Luo et al. [29] is the other study that considered all possible supply 
8 
chain power structures in their investigation of optimal pricing policies for differentiated 
brands. However, they study a monopoly common retailer channel, in which, two 
manufacturers supply goods to the same retailer. Furthermore, they focus on the combination 
of brand preference and customer valuation in their pricing model, which is quite different to 
our model. 
 
Ⅲ. MODEL DESCRIPTION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This research considers a supply chain environment that is made of a manufacturer and two 
rival retailers. The manufacturer supplies the same products to the retailers and sells to 
consumers through them. The model is illustrated as Figure 1 and the main notations used are 
listed in Table 1.  
 
Fig. 1 The model 
Table 1. The notations 
𝑤 Unit wholesale price  
𝑝1 The unit retail price of Retailer 1 
𝑝2 The unit retail price of Retailer 2 
𝑐 Manufacturer’s unit manufacturing cost 
𝑚1 The marginal profit of Retailer 1 
𝑚2 The marginal profit of Retailer 2 
𝑞1 Customer demand faced by Retailer 1 
𝑞2 Customer demand faced by Retailer 2 
𝜋𝑚(𝑤) The profit of manufacturer 
𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1) The profit of Retailer 1 
𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2) The profit of Retailer 2 
𝜋𝑠
𝑚𝑛 The maximum overall profit in the MS-N model 
Retailer 2 
Manufacturer 
Retailer 1 
𝑤 
𝑝1 
𝑝2 
𝑤 
𝑞2 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝2 + 𝛾𝑝1 
𝑞1 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝1 + 𝛾𝑝2 
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𝜋𝑠
𝑛 The maximum overall profit in the VN model 
𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑛 The maximum overall profit in the RS-N model 
    We assume that 𝑝𝑖 > 𝑤 > 𝑐, which ensures both the manufacturer and the retailers to 
make profits, 𝑖 = 1,2. The customer demand of retailer 𝑖 is 𝑞𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾𝑝𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 
and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, where 𝛼 means the potential market size, 𝛽 means the self-price sensitivity and 𝛾 
means the cross-price sensitivity. 𝛽 > 𝛾 > 0 represents that the self-price sensitivity is higher 
than the cross-price sensitivity. This linear deterministic demand function is widely adopted in 
the marketing and supply chain management literature as an acceptable approximation of 
demand [9], [38]. Although other demand functions can also yield similar results, the linear 
deterministic demand function is adopted because it is more analytically traceable and enables 
us to obtain closed-form insights. 
Based on above assumptions, we get that the manufacturer’s profit, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤), is 
𝜋𝑚(𝑤) = 𝑤(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑐(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) 
The first part of profit function is the manufacturer’s total revenue from retailers, and the 
second part means the total manufacture costs. Then 
   𝜋𝑚(𝑤) = (𝑤 − 𝑐)[(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝1 + 𝛾𝑝2) + (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝2 + 𝛾𝑝1)]         (3.1) 
Replace 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑤 + 𝑚𝑖 to (3.1), we get 
    𝜋𝑚(𝑤) = (𝑤 − 𝑐)[2𝛼 − (𝛽 − γ)(2𝑤 + 𝑚1 + 𝑚2)]             (3.2) 
Retailer 1’s profit, 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1), is 
𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1) = 𝑝1𝑞1 − 𝑤𝑞1 
The first part means retailer 1’s revenue from sale, and the second part is the ordering cost 
of retailer 1. Then 
         𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1) = (𝑝1 − 𝑤)(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝1 + 𝛾𝑝2)                       (3.3) 
Similarly, retailer 2’s profit, 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2), is 
𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2) = 𝑝2𝑞2 − 𝑤𝑞2 
The first part means retailer 2’s revenue from sale, and the second part is retailer 2’s order 
cost. Then 
     𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2) = (𝑝2 − 𝑤)(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝2 + 𝛾𝑝1)                   (3.4) 
According to the vertical market power relationships between the manufacturer and the 
retailers, the power structure can be divided into three scenarios: Manufacturer Stackelberg 
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(MS) model, Vertical Nash (VN) model, and Retailer Stackelberg (RS) model. 
 
Ⅳ. MODELS 
A. Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) models 
In a MS model, the manufacturer is the market leader and the two competing retailers are the 
market followers. According to the power relationship between the two competing retailers, the 
horizontal market competition has two sub-games: Stackelberg and Nash. Thus, according to 
the bi-dimensional power relationships, there are two game models: MS and Nash (MS-N), and 
MS and Stackelberg (MS-S). We will discuss the two game models separately. 
MS-N model 
In the MS-N model, the manufacturer and the retailers make relevant decisions in sequence, 
and the decisions of the two competing retailers are simultaneously made. More specifically, 
retailer 1 determines her retail price given the retail price of retailer 2 and the manufacturer’s 
wholesale price, and retailer 2 decides her retail price given retailer 1’s retail price and the 
manufacturer’s wholesale price. Second, the wholesale price is then decided by the 
manufacturer using the response functions of the two competing retailers for her maximum 
profit. Finally, the manufacturer and the two retailers obtain their revenue after sales are made. 
MS-S model 
In the MS-S model, without loss of generality, retailer 1 is assumed as the leader and retailer 2 
as the follower. The decision sequence of involved firms is described as follows. First, retailer 
2 decides her retail price given retailer 1’s retail price and the manufacturer’s wholesale price. 
Second, given the manufacturer’s wholesale price, retailer 1 decides her retail price according 
to the response function of retailer 2. Third, the manufacturer’s wholesale price is determined 
based on the response functions of the two competing retailers. Finally, when end consumers’ 
demand is realized, the manufacturer and the two competing retailers obtain their revenue 
according. 
B. Vertical Nash (VN) model 
In the VN model, vertically, the manufacturer and the retailers have same supply chain power, 
and, horizontally, the two rival retailers have the equal market power. 
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    In the VN model, the supply chain members simultaneously make their decisions. First, 
retailer 1 determines her retail price given retailer 2’s price and the manufacturer’s wholesale 
price, and retailer 2 decides her retail price given retailer 1’s retail price and the manufacturer’s 
wholesale price, and the manufacturer decides the wholesale price given retailers’ retail prices. 
Then, all supply chain members obtain their revenue after the customer demand is realized. 
C. Retailer Stackelberg (RS) models 
In a RS model, the retailers are regarded as the leader and the manufacturer is considered as the 
follower. According to horizontal market power between the two competing retailers, there are 
two sub-games: Stackelberg and Nash. Thus, according to the bi-dimensional power 
relationships, there are two game models: RS and Nash (RS-N), and RS and Stackelberg 
(RS-S). We will discuss the two models separately. 
RS-N model 
In the RS-N model, the detail of the event sequence is explained as follows. First, the 
wholesale price is determined by the manufacturer given retailers’ retail prices. Then, the two 
retailers simultaneously decide their retail prices given their rival’s retail price and the response 
function of the manufacturer. Finally, the supply chain members obtain their revenue 
respectively after the sales are realized. 
RS-S model 
In the RS-S model, the detail of the event sequence is as follows. First, the wholesale price is 
decided by the manufacturer given retailers’ retail prices. Second, given retail 1’s retail price, 
retailer 2 decides her retail price using the response functions of the manufacturer’s wholesale 
price for the maximum profit. Third, retailer 1 decides her retail price using the response 
function of retailer 2 and the manufacturer for the maximum profit. Finally, the supply chain 
members gain their revenue after customer demand is realized. 
Regarding the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price (𝑤𝑖), retailer 1’s optimal retail 
price (𝑝1
𝑖 ) and optimal order quantity (𝑞1
𝑖 ), and retailer 2’s optimal retail price (𝑝2
𝑖 ) and optimal 
order quantity (𝑞2
𝑖 ) in the MS-N model (𝑖 = 𝑚𝑛), MS-S model (𝑖 = 𝑚𝑠), VN model (𝑖 = 𝑛), 
RS-N model (𝑖 = 𝑟𝑛) and RS-S model (𝑖 = 𝑟𝑠), the following lemma is derived. 
Lemma 1 The optimal decisions of both the manufacturer and the retailers are summarized 
as Table 2. 
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Table 2. Optimal decisions 
𝑖 𝒊 = 𝒎𝒏 𝒊 = 𝒎𝒔 𝒊 = 𝒏 𝒊 = 𝒓𝒏 𝒊 = 𝒓𝒔 
𝑤𝑖  
𝛼
2(𝛽 − 𝛾)
+
𝑐
2
 
𝛼
2(𝛽 − 𝛾)
+
𝑐
2
 
𝛼𝛽
(3𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
+
(2𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐
3𝛽 − 𝛾
 
2𝛼𝛽
(7𝛽 − 3𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
+
(5𝛽 − 3𝛾)𝑐
7𝛽 − 3𝛾
 
𝛼(59𝛽3 + 45𝛽2𝛾 − 15𝛽𝛾2 − 9𝛾3)
2(𝛽 − 𝛾)(17𝛽 + 3𝛾)(6𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛾 − 3𝛾2)
+
(145𝛽3 + 25𝛽2𝛾 − 81𝛽𝛾2 − 9𝛾3)𝑐
2(17𝛽 + 3𝛾)(6𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛾 − 3𝛾2)
 
𝑝1
𝑖  
𝛼(3𝛽 − 2𝛾)
2(2𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
+
𝛽𝑐
2(2𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
𝛼(6𝛽2 − 𝛽𝛾 − 3𝛾2)
4(𝛽 − 𝛾)(2𝛽2 − 𝛾2)
+
(2𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛾 − 𝛾2)𝑐
4(2𝛽2 − 𝛾2)
 
𝛼(2𝛽 − 𝛾)
(3𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
+
𝛽𝑐
3𝛽 − 𝛾
 
𝛼(5𝛽 − 3𝛾)
(7𝛽 − 3𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
+
2𝛽𝑐
7𝛽 − 3𝛾
 
𝛼(72𝛽3 + 13𝛽2𝛾 − 36𝛽𝛾2 − 9𝛾3)
(𝛽 − 𝛾)(17𝛽 + 3𝛾)(6𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛾 − 3𝛾2)
+
2𝛽(15𝛽2 + 11𝛽𝛾 − 6𝛾2)𝑐
(17𝛽 + 3𝛾)(6𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛾 − 3𝛾2)
 
𝑞1
𝑖  
𝛽[𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐]
2(2𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
(2𝛽 + 𝛾)[𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐]
8𝛽
 
𝛽[𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐]
3𝛽 − 𝛾
 
2𝛽[𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐]
7𝛽 − 3𝛾
 
(5𝛽 + 3𝛾)[𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐]
17𝛽 + 3𝛾
 
𝑝2
𝑖  
𝛼(3𝛽 − 2𝛾)
2(2𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
+
𝛽𝑐
2(2𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
𝛼(12𝛽3 − 2𝛽2𝛾 − 7𝛽𝛾2 + 𝛾3)
8𝛽(𝛽 − 𝛾)(2𝛽2 − 𝛾2)
+
(4𝛽3 + 2𝛽2𝛾 − 𝛽𝛾2 − 𝛾3)𝑐
8𝛽(2𝛽2 − 𝛾2)
 
𝛼(2𝛽 − 𝛾)
(3𝛽 − 𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
+
𝛽𝑐
3𝛽 − 𝛾
 
𝛼(5𝛽 − 3𝛾)
(7𝛽 − 3𝛾)(𝛽 − 𝛾)
+
2𝛽𝑐
7𝛽 − 3𝛾
 
𝛼𝛽(73𝛽2 + 12𝛽𝛾 − 45𝛾2)
(𝛽 − 𝛾)(17𝛽 + 3𝛾)(6𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛾 − 3𝛾2)
+
(29𝛽3 + 23𝛽2𝛾 − 3𝛽𝛾2 − 9𝛾3)𝑐
(17𝛽 + 3𝛾)(6𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛾 − 3𝛾2)
 
𝑞2
𝑖  
𝛽[𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐]
2(2𝛽 − 𝛾)
 
(4𝛽2 + 2𝛽𝛾 − 𝛾2)[𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐]
8(2𝛽2 − 𝛾2)
 
𝛽[𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐]
3𝛽 − 𝛾
 
2𝛽[𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐]
7𝛽 − 3𝛾
 
𝛽(29𝛽2 + 22𝛽𝛾 − 3𝛾2)[𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐]
(17𝛽 + 3𝛾)(6𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛾 − 3𝛾2)
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Ⅴ. DISCUSSIONS 
In the section, the effects of vertical power structure, horizontal power structure, and potential 
market size (𝛼) on the supply chain are explored respectively. 
A. The effect of vertical power structure 
It is started with analyzing the effect of power relationship in the vertical competition. 
Regarding the effect of vertical power structure on the pricing decisions, we obtain: 
Proposition 1 𝒘𝒎𝒏 > 𝒘𝒏 > 𝒘𝒓𝒏, 𝒑𝒊
𝒎𝒏 > 𝒑𝒊
𝒓𝒏 > 𝒑𝒊
𝒏, and 𝒒𝒊
𝒏 > 𝒒𝒊
𝒓𝒏 > 𝒒𝒊
𝒎𝒏, 𝒊 = 𝟏, 𝟐. 
It means that when the two competing retailers is in the horizontal Nash power structure, both 
the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and the retailers’ optimal retail price in the 
Manufacturer Stackelberg power structure are the highest. The wholesale price in the Retailer 
Stackelberg power structure is the lowest and the vertical Nash power structure has the lowest 
retail prices. The result shows that it is more likely for the manufacturer to set a high 
wholesale price when the manufacturer is more powerful party comparing to other supply 
chain members. The higher wholesale price will have a knock on effect on the retail price. On 
the contrary, the retailers’ optimal ordering quantities in the vertical Nash power structure are 
largest in size, and that in the Manufacturer Stackelberg power structure is smallest in size. 
This is easy to explain as the low retail prices will stimulate the customer demand and result 
in higher ordering quantities from the retailers. It is opposite when there are high retail prices.  
    Regarding the effect of vertical power structure on the maximum profits of individual 
firms and the entire supply chain, we derive: 
Proposition 2 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒎𝒏) > 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒏) > 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒓𝒏) , 𝝅𝒓𝒊(𝒑𝒊
𝒓𝒏) > 𝝅𝒓𝒊(𝒑𝒊
𝒏) > 𝝅𝒓𝒊(𝒑𝒊
𝒎𝒏)  and 
𝝅𝒔
𝒏 > 𝝅𝒔
𝒓𝒏 > 𝝅𝒔
𝒎𝒏, 𝒊 = 𝟏, 𝟐. 
It indicates that when the two competing retailers are in the horizontal balanced power 
structure, the manufacturer’s profit in the Manufacturer Stackelberg power structure is the 
highest because of the highest wholesale price, and that in the Retailer Stackelberg power 
structure is the lowest because of the lowest wholesale price. In contrast, the retailers’ profits 
in the Manufacturer Stackelberg power structure are the lowest, which is contributed by a 
high product cost and a subdued customer demand. Those in the Retailer Stackelberg power 
structure are the highest, which is contributed by a low product cost and a steady customer 
demand. In a word, for the manufacturer or the retailers, a more powerful position over other 
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supply chain members enables them to gain more profit. 
    When the two competing retailers have balanced market power, the maximum profit of 
the structure with vertical competition being Nash has higher maximum supply chain profit 
than those in the structures with vertical competition being Stackelberg games. This is can be 
explained by the fact that a balanced power relationship will drive down the retailer prices and 
therefore stimulate more customer demand. At the same time, a fair competition will enable 
the gained profit to be more evenly distributed to individual supply chain members. These 
outcomes will further improve the competitiveness of the supply chain. Therefore, from the 
supply chain’s point of view, more profit can be achieved in a balanced power structure.  
B. The effect of horizontal power structure 
Then, we analyze the effect of power relationships in the horizontal competition on the supply 
chain. To avoid the interference of vertical power dynamics, the analysis is based on the same 
vertical power structure. Regarding the effect of horizontal power structure on the pricing 
decisions, we obtain: 
Proposition 3  
(1) In Manufacturer Stackelberg models, 𝒘𝒎𝒏 = 𝒘𝒎𝒔 and 𝒑𝟏
𝒎𝒔 > 𝒑𝟐
𝒎𝒔 > 𝒑𝟐
𝒎𝒏 = 𝒑𝟏
𝒎𝒏. 
(2) In Retailer Stackelberg models, if 𝜷 = 𝟑𝜸, then 𝒘𝒓𝒏 = 𝒘𝒓𝒔 and 𝒑𝟏
𝒓𝒔 = 𝒑𝟏
𝒓𝒏 = 𝒑𝟐
𝒓𝒏 =
𝒑𝟐
𝒓𝒔 ; if 𝜷 > 𝟑𝜸 , then 𝒘𝒓𝒏 < 𝒘𝒓𝒔 and 𝒑𝟏
𝒓𝒔 < 𝒑𝟏
𝒓𝒏 = 𝒑𝟐
𝒓𝒏 < 𝒑𝟐
𝒓𝒔 ; if 𝜷 < 𝟑𝜸 , then  𝒘𝒓𝒏 >
𝒘𝒓𝒔and 𝒑𝟏
𝒓𝒏 = 𝒑𝟐
𝒓𝒏 < 𝒑𝟐
𝒓𝒔 < 𝒑𝟏
𝒓𝒔. 
    Proposition 3(1) means that in the Manufacturer Stackelberg models, the manufacturer’s 
optimal wholesale prices are equal whenever horizontal competition is Nash or Stackelberg 
games. But the two competing retailers’ optimal retail prices in the Nash game are both lower 
than those in the Stackelberg games, and the optimal retail price of retailer 1 is higher than 
that of retailer 2 in the horizontal Stackelberg games. It is interesting that in a power structure 
with vertical competition being Manufacturer Stackelberg, the power dynamics of the 
horizontal competition have no effect on the optimal wholesale price. However, there is more 
competition between the two retailers in the game with horizontal competition being Nash 
and such a competitive market environment leads to lower optimal retail prices. In the 
horizontal Stackelberg games, retailer 1 is the leader and as a result a higher retail price will 
be set by retailer 1 than that set by retailer 2. 
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    Proposition 3(2) means that in the Retailer Stackelberg models, if the self-price 
sensitivity is significant to a certain degree as compared to the cross-price sensitivity, the 
optimal wholesale price and the optimal retail prices in the game with horizontal competition 
being Nash are equal to those in the game with horizontal competition being Stackelberg. If 
the ratio between self-price sensitivity and cross-price sensitivity is higher than a critical 
value, both the optimal wholesale price and the optimal retail price of retailer 2 in the game 
with horizontal competition being Nash are lower than those in the game with horizontal 
competition being Stackelberg. But retailer 1’s optimal retail price in the game with 
horizontal competition being Nash is higher than that in the game with horizontal competition 
being Stackelberg. In contrast, if the same sensitivity ratio is lower than a critical value, the 
optimal wholesale price in the game with horizontal competition being Nash is higher than 
that in the game with horizontal competition being Stackelberg, but the retailers’ optimal 
retail prices in the game with horizontal competition being Nash are lower than that in the 
game with horizontal competition being Stackelberg. It indicates that, in a Retailer 
Stackelberg power structure, the power dynamics between the two retailers affect the optimal 
wholesale price. There is more competition in the game with horizontal competition being 
Nash than the game with horizontal competition being Stackelberg. However, in a Retailer 
Stackelberg power structure, more competition leads to a lower optimal retail price for retailer 
2, but does not always result in a lower optimal retail price for retailer 1. Therefore, it is 
important for the firms to take the bi-dimensional power relationship in consideration when 
making important operations decisions.  
    Regarding the effect of horizontal power structure on the maximum profit of the supply 
chain, we obtain: 
Proposition 4 
(1) In Manufacturer Stackelberg models, 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒎𝒏) > 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒎𝒔) , 𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
𝒎𝒏) =
𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐
𝒎𝒏) < 𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
𝒎𝒔) < 𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐
𝒎𝒔) and 𝝅𝒔
𝒎𝒏 > 𝝅𝒔
𝒎𝒔. 
(2) In Retailer Stackelberg models, if 𝜷 = 𝟑𝜸, then 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒓𝒏) = 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒓𝒔), 𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
𝒓𝒏) =
𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
𝒓𝒔), 𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐
𝒓𝒏) = 𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐
𝒓𝒔) and 𝝅𝒔
𝒓𝒏 = 𝝅𝒔
𝒓𝒔; if 𝜷 > 𝟑𝜸, then 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒓𝒏) < 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒓𝒔), 
𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
𝒓𝒏) < 𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
𝒓𝒔) , 𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐
𝒓𝒏) > 𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐
𝒓𝒔) , and 𝝅𝒔
𝒓𝒏 < 𝝅𝒔
𝒓𝒔 ; if 𝜷 < 𝟑𝜸 , 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒓𝒏) >
𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒓𝒔), 𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
𝒓𝒏) < 𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
𝒓𝒔), 𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐
𝒓𝒏) < 𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐
𝒓𝒔), and 𝝅𝒔
𝒓𝒏 > 𝝅𝒔
𝒓𝒔. 
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Proposition 4(1) indicates that in the Manufacturer Stackelberg models, the maximum 
profits for the manufacturer and the entire supply chain in the game with horizontal 
competition being Nash is more than those in the game with horizontal competition being 
Stackelberg. The two competing retailers’ maximum profits in the game with horizontal 
competition being Nash are less than those in the game with horizontal competition being 
Stackelberg. It indicates that, in a Manufacturer Stackelberg power structure, more 
competition between retailers will benefit the manufacturer and the whole supply chain but 
hurt the retailers’ profits. One interesting finding in Proposition 4(1) is that in the 
Manufacturer Stackelberg models, the maximum profit of retailer 1 (leader) in the game with 
horizontal competition being Stackelberg is lower than that of retailer 2 (follower). It means 
that the follower will gain more profit than the leader. Based on this conclusion, neither 
retailer wishes to be first to announce its retail price. This may be explained by the fact that 
the price information is regarded as trade secret for retailers. Once it leaks and is known by 
their competitor, it will have a genitive impact on its own financial benefit. 
    Proposition 4(2) also indicates that in the Retailer Stackelberg models, if the ratio 
between self-price sensitivity and cross-price sensitivity reaches a critical value, all the 
manufacturer’s, the retailers’ and the whole supply chain’s maximum profits in the game with 
horizontal competition being Nash equal to those in the game with horizontal competition 
being Stackelberg. That is, in such a condition, the power relationship between the two 
retailers has no effect on the manufacturer’s, the retailers’ and the whole supply chain’s 
maximum profits. If the same sensitivity ratio is higher than this critical value, the 
manufacturer’s, retailer 1’s and the whole supply chain’s maximum profits in the game with 
horizontal competition being Nash are less than those in the game with horizontal competition 
being Stackelberg. But the maximum profit of retailer 2 is more than that in the game with 
horizontal competition being Stackelberg. That is, in such a condition, a more balanced power 
relationship between the two retailers will hurt the manufacturer, the leader retailer (retailer 1) 
and the whole supply chain, but will benefit the follower retailer (retailer 2). If the sensitivity 
ratio is lower than this critical value, both the manufacturer’s and the whole supply chain’s 
maximum profits in the game with horizontal competition being Nash are more than those in 
the game with horizontal competition being Stackelberg, but the retailers’ maximum profits 
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are less than those in the horizontal Stackelberg game. That is, in such a condition, a more 
balanced power relationship between the two retailers will benefit the manufacturer and the 
whole supply chain, but will hurt the two competing retailers. 
C. The effect of potential market size 
Now we discuss the effect of potential market size (𝛼) on the supply chain’s decisions and 
profits. The following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 5 (1) 𝒘𝒊 , 𝒑𝟏
𝒊 , 𝒒𝟏
𝒊 , 𝒑𝟐
𝒊  and 𝒒𝟐
𝒊  all increase in 𝜶; (2) 𝝅𝒎(𝒘
𝒊), 𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
𝒊 ), 
𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐
𝒊 ) and 𝝅𝒔
𝒊  all increase in 𝜶. Where 𝒊 = 𝒎𝒏, 𝒎𝒔, 𝒏, 𝒓𝒏, 𝒓𝒔. 
This proposition means that in every power structure, when the potential market size (𝛼) 
is large, the manufacturer will set a high wholesale price and the retailers will set high retail 
prices and sell more products. Then the manufacturer, the retailers and the supply chain will 
gain more profits. In contrast, when the potential market size (𝛼) is low, the manufacturer will 
set a low wholesale price and the retailers will set low retail prices and sell less products in 
every power structure. Then the manufacturer, the retailers and the supply chain will be less 
profitable. It is not surprising that individual firms and the supply chain will benefit from a 
large market size. The manufacturer and the retailers should certainly make effort in 
expanding the potential market. 
 
Ⅵ. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
Although the analytical results in the last section provide many insights of the effect of 
the bi-dimensional power structure on the supply chain decisions and performances, we 
mainly look at the effects of vertical or horizontal power structure separately. In the numerical 
analysis, we attempt to combine both the vertical and horizontal dimension of the power 
structure and evaluate the significance of their impact on the manufacturer and retailers 
individually and collectively. To do this, we will compare the financial performances of 
individual firms and the whole supply chain under the possible five alternative power 
structures. In addition, as shown in the previous section that both self-price and cross-price 
sensitivities play an important role in the effect of horizontal power structure, further analysis 
about the demand sensitivities is also presented. First, we set 𝛼 = 10, 𝛽 = 3, c = 0.1. The 
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demand function parameters and cost information used in the numerical analysis are 
comparable to the similar studies [10, 11, 29] in the literature. To illustrate how the ratio of 
own-price sensitivity and cross-price sensitivity affect the impact of vertical and horizontal 
power structure on the firms’ performance individually and collectively, a range of cross-price 
sensitivities values were simulated. The maximum profits of the manufacturer, the two 
retailers and the whole supply chain under different power structures are shown in Fig. 2-5. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Manufacturer’s maximum profit under different power structures 
 
 
Fig. 3. Retailer 1’s maximum profit under different power structures 
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Fig. 4. Retailer 2’s maximum profit under different power structures 
 
 
Fig. 5. Supply chain’s maximum total profit under different power structures 
It supports the findings in the discussion that more power over its vertical supply chain 
partners enables the manufacturer or the two retailers to gain more profit as shown in Fig.2 
that the manufacturer makes most profit in the Manufacturer Stackelberg games and in 
Fig.3-4 that the two retailers will gain more profits when they hold equal or more power as 
compared to the manufacturer. Collectively, the whole supply chain will deliver the best 
performance in the balanced power structure as shown in Fig.5. Furthermore, the numerical 
analysis also supports the finding of Proposition 4(2) that the horizontal power structure have 
no effect on the supply chain financial performance collectively and individually when the 
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ratio of own-price sensitivity and cross-price sensitivity reach a certain value (e.g. β/γ=3). 
More interestingly, the effect of horizontal power structure on the supply chain 
performances is less significant as compared to the effect of the vertical power structure. It is 
consistent in the Manufacturer Stackelberg games, the Retailer Stackelberg games, and the 
Nash game as illustrated from Fig.2 to Fig.5. This finding is important as it indicates that it is 
more economical viable for the retailers to enhance its power over its supply chain 
counterparties than over its market rivals. Clearly, the increase in the vertical power will bring 
the retailers more financial benefits. This may be explained by the fact that the first move 
advantage is significant in the negotiation with the supply chain counterparties but not in 
setting the retail price to compete with your market rivals. Nevertheless, this finding applies 
to a common manufacturer supply chain setting and might be different when applying to other 
supply chain settings.           
 
Ⅶ. CONCLUSIONS 
This study, examines how decisions and performances of a supply chain are affected by the 
power relationship in both vertical and horizontal competitions. We consider a triadic supply 
chain setting. We define five different possible supply chain power structures using five 
non-cooperative games, which are expressed by the different sequences in which the 
wholesale and retail pricing decisions are made by the manufacturer and retailers, respectively. 
The optimal supply chain decisions (e.g. prices and quantities) and profits are derived in each 
game. Through the comparison of equilibrium decisions and performances, our research 
systematically examines the impact of bi-dimensional power structure on the supply chain. 
We highlight some interesting observations from our research findings. 
    Observation 1: Our findings show that, in most cases, the power relationships in both 
the vertical and horizontal competitions have a profound influence on the manufacturer’s and 
the retailers’ supply chain decisions. Nevertheless, the horizontal power relationship between 
the two retailers has no effect on the manufacturer’s wholesale price when the vertical 
competition is Manufacturer Stackelberg. It also has no effect on supply chain decisions when 
the ratio between the self-price sensitivity and the cross-price sensitivity meets a certain 
condition when the vertical competition is Retailer Stackelberg. It indicates that the power 
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aspect is the main factor in determining the wholesale price when the manufacturer is the 
dominant force. In contrast, other factor such as price sensitivities will also influence the 
wholesale pricing decision if the manufacturer is no longer the dominant one.   
    Observation 2: The implications of power relationship in vertical competition or 
horizontal competition on the supply chain decisions are clear. Generally, more power over its 
supply chain partners or rival competitors enables the manufacturer or the leader retailer to set 
up higher wholesale price or retail price to gain more profit, which is in line with most of 
previous studies [10], [44], [46] in the literature. However, the impacts of the bi-dimensional 
power structure on firms’ price decisions are much more complicated. The power relationship 
between the two retailers and the price sensitivity ratio will affect the optimal retail prices.    
    Observation 3: Similarly, the bi-dimensional power dynamics have a significant impact 
on the supply chain financial performance both individually and collectively, except the case 
that, in the game with vertical competition being Retailer Stackelberg. The power relationship 
in the horizontal competition between the two retailers has no effect on individual firms’ and 
the supply chain’s profits when the ratio between the self-price sensitivity and the cross-price 
sensitivity meets a certain condition. This finding is interesting as it indicates that when the 
retailers are the dominant force, the profit for the two retailers and the supply chain is mainly 
determined by the market competition, which is mainly characterized by the demand 
sensitivity towards the retailer’s own price or her competitor’s price rather than the power 
relationship between the two rival retailers.      
Observation 4: While the implications of power relationship in vertical competition or 
horizontal competition on the firms’ and supply chain performance have been clearly shown 
in our analysis, the impact of bi-dimensional power structure on individual firms’ and the 
supply chain’s performance are much more complicated. Surprisingly, the vertical supply 
chain power relationship has a more significant impact on the financial performances of the 
individual firms or the whole supply chain than the horizontal power relationship.  
   The key contributions of this research are summarized as follows. Theoretically, this 
paper systematically examines the effects of bi-dimensional power structure on a triadic 
supply chain. Our finding also reveals that the impacts of bi-dimensional power structure 
depend on the nature of customer demand, which supports the view of Shi et al. [39]. This 
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work will provide a solid platform to investigate other strategic and operational problems that 
are affected by both vertical and horizontal power structure. Managerially, this work provides 
important implications that are supportive for companies to make strategic and operational 
decisions. For instance, our findings show that, from individual firms’ perspective, more 
power over their rival competitors or supply chain counter parties will enable firms to gain 
more profit. In contrast, the supply chain will gain extra financial benefits if a more balanced 
power relationship exists both vertically and horizontally. Therefore, it is important for 
individual firms to seek ways in enhancing their market and supply chain power in order to 
acquire superior financial benefits. On the other hand, strategically, it is crucial for managers 
to develop a more power balanced supply chain environment that promotes fair and effective 
competition to improve its supply chain competitiveness. 
Similar to any other models previous studies, there are also some research limitations. 
For instance, we only consider a simplified model setting. Although it provides some 
interesting insights, one future extension is to consider a more common model setting that 
consists of multiple manufacturers as well as retailers. Second, our model assumes a linear 
deterministic demand. As our research findings indicated that the impact of bi-dimensional 
power structure on the supply chain are dependent on the nature of customer demand, which 
is the ratio between the self-price sensitivity and the cross-price sensitivity in this work. 
Another important research extension is to model the stochastic demand instead of the 
deterministic one. Finally, another plausible research extension is to consider other important 
operational and strategic decisions such as multiple products [45], supply chain coordination 
[11], [15], and supply contracts [40] in the investigation of bi-dimensional power structure. 
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Appendix 
Lemma 1 proof: From (3.3), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝1
= 𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑝1 + 𝛾𝑝2 + 𝛽𝑤, 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝12
= −2𝛽 <
0, so 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1) is concave in 𝑝1. Similarly, from (3.4), we get  
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝2
= 𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑝2 + 𝛾𝑝1 +
𝛽𝑤 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝22
= −2𝛽 < 0, so 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2) is concave in 𝑝2. From 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝1
=
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝2
= 0, 
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we get 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑤
2𝛽−𝛾
. Replace 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑤
2𝛽−𝛾
 to (3.1), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤
=
2𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝑤−𝑐)]
2𝛽−𝛾
 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤2
= −
4𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)
2𝛽−𝛾
< 0, so 𝜋𝑚(𝑤) is concave in 𝑤. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤
=
0, we get 𝑤𝑚𝑛 =
𝛼
2(𝛽−𝛾)
+
𝑐
2
.  Replace 𝑤𝑚𝑛  to 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑤
2𝛽−𝛾
, we get 𝑝1
𝑚𝑛 = 𝑝2
𝑚𝑛 =
𝛼(3𝛽−2𝛾)
2(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
+
𝛽𝑐
2(2𝛽−𝛾)
. Then, we get 𝑞1
𝑚𝑛 = 𝑞2
𝑚𝑛 =
𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
2(2𝛽−𝛾)
. 
From (3.4), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝2
= 𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑝2 + 𝛾𝑝1 + 𝛽𝑤  and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝22
= −2𝛽 < 0. So, 
𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2) is concave in 𝑝2. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝2
= 0, we get 𝑝2 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑤+𝛾𝑝1
2𝛽
. Replace 𝑝2 =
𝛼+𝛽𝑤+𝛾𝑝1
2𝛽
 
to (2.3), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝1
=
𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)+(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽+𝛾)𝑤−2(2𝛽2−𝛾2)𝑝1
2𝛽
 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝12
=
−(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
𝛽
< 0. 
So, 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1) is concave in 𝑝1. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝1
= 0, we get 𝑝1 =
𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)+(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽+𝛾)𝑤
4𝛽2−2𝛾2
. Replace 
𝑝1 =
𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)+(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽+𝛾)𝑤
4𝛽2−2𝛾2
 to 𝑝2, we get 𝑝2 =
𝛼(4𝛽2+2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2)+(4𝛽3+2𝛽2𝛾−𝛽𝛾2−𝛾3)𝑤
4𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
. Replace 
𝑝1 =
𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)+(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽+𝛾)𝑤
4𝛽2−2𝛾2
 and 𝑝2 =
𝛼(4𝛽2+2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2)+(4𝛽3+2𝛽2𝛾−𝛽𝛾2−𝛾3)𝑤
4𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
 to (3.1), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤
=
[𝛼+(𝛽−𝛾)(𝑐−2𝑤)](8𝛽3+4𝛽2𝛾−3𝛽𝛾2−𝛾3)
4𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤2
= −
2(𝛽−𝛾)(8𝛽3+4𝛽2𝛾−3𝛽𝛾2−𝛾3)
4𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
< 0. 
So, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤) is concave in 𝑤. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤
= 0, we get 𝑤𝑚𝑠 =
𝛼
2(𝛽−𝛾)
+
𝑐
2
. Replace 𝑤𝑚𝑠 to 
𝑝1 =
𝛼(2𝛽+𝛾)+(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽+𝛾)𝑤
4𝛽2−2𝛾2
 and 𝑝2 =
𝛼(4𝛽2+2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2)+(4𝛽3+2𝛽2𝛾−𝛽𝛾2−𝛾3)𝑤
4𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
, we get 𝑝1
𝑚𝑠 =
𝛼(6𝛽2−𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
4(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
+
(2𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−𝛾2)𝑐
4(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
 and 𝑝2
𝑚𝑠 =
𝛼(12𝛽3−2𝛽2𝛾−7𝛽𝛾2+𝛾3)
8𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
+
(4𝛽3+2𝛽2𝛾−𝛽𝛾2−𝛾3)𝑐
8𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
. Then, 
we get 𝑞1
𝑚𝑠 =
(2𝛽+𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
8𝛽
 and 𝑞2
𝑚𝑠 =
(4𝛽2+2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
8(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
.  
From (3.2), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤
= [2𝛼 − (𝛽 − γ)(2𝑤 + 𝑚1 + 𝑚2)] − 2(𝛽 − γ)(𝑤 − 𝑐) and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤2
= −4(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0. So, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤) is concave in 𝑤. From (3.3), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝1
= α −
2𝛽𝑝1 + 𝛾𝑝2 + 𝛽𝑤 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝12
= −2𝛽 < 0. So, 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1) is concave in 𝑝1. From (3.4), we 
get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝2
= 𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑝2 + 𝛾𝑝1 + 𝛽𝑤 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝22
= −2𝛽 < 0. So, 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2) is concave in 
𝑝2. From 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤
=
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝1
=
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝2
= 0, we get 𝑤𝑛 =
𝛼𝛽
(3𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
+
(2𝛽−𝛾)𝑐
3𝛽−𝛾
, 𝑝1
𝑛 = 𝑝2
𝑛 =
𝛼(2𝛽−𝛾)
(3𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
+
𝛽𝑐
3𝛽−𝛾
. Then, we get 𝑞1
𝑛 = 𝑞2
𝑛 =
𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
3𝛽−𝛾
.  
From (3.2), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤
= [2𝛼 − (𝛽 − γ)(2𝑤 + 𝑚1 + 𝑚2)] − 2(𝛽 − γ)(𝑤 − 𝑐) and 
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𝑑2𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤2
= −4(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0. So, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤) is concave in 𝑤. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤
= 0, we get [2𝛼 −
(𝛽 − γ)(2𝑤 + 𝑚1 + 𝑚2)] − 2(𝛽 − γ)(𝑤 − 𝑐) = 0 , that is [2𝛼 − (𝛽 − γ)(𝑝1 + 𝑝2)] −
2(𝛽 − γ)(𝑤 − 𝑐) = 0. Then, we get 𝑤 = 𝑐 −
𝑝1+𝑝2
2
+
𝛼
𝛽−𝛾
. Replace 𝑤 = 𝑐 −
𝑝1+𝑝2
2
+
𝛼
𝛽−𝛾
 to 
(3.3), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝1
=
𝛼(5𝛽−3𝛾)
2(𝛽−𝛾)
+ 𝛽(𝑐 − 3𝑝1) −
(𝛽−3𝛾)𝑝2
2
 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝12
= −3𝛽 < 0 . So, 
𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)  is concave in 𝑝1 . Similarly, replace 𝑤 = 𝑐 −
𝑝1+𝑝2
2
+
𝛼
𝛽−𝛾
 to (3.4), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝2
=
𝛼(5𝛽−3𝛾)
2(𝛽−𝛾)
+ 𝛽(𝑐 − 3𝑝2) −
(𝛽−3𝛾)𝑝1
2
 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝22
= −3𝛽 < 0 . So, 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)  is 
concave in 𝑝2 . From 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝1
=
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝2
= 0 , we get 𝑝1
𝑟𝑛 = 𝑝2
𝑟𝑛 =
𝛼(5𝛽−3𝛾)
(7𝛽−3𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
+
2𝛽𝑐
7𝛽−3𝛾
. 
Replace 𝑝1
𝑟𝑛  and 𝑝2
𝑟𝑛  to 𝑤 = 𝑐 −
𝑝1+𝑝2
2
+
𝛼
𝛽−𝛾
, we get 𝑤𝑟𝑛 =
2𝛼𝛽
(7𝛽−3𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
+
(5𝛽−3𝛾)𝑐
7𝛽−3𝛾
. 
Then, we get 𝑞1
𝑟𝑛 = 𝑞2
𝑟𝑛 =
2𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
7𝛽−3𝛾
.  
From (3.2), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤
= [2𝛼 − (𝛽 − γ)(2𝑤 + 𝑚1 + 𝑚2)] − 2(𝛽 − γ)(𝑤 − 𝑐) and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤2
= −4(𝛽 − 𝛾) < 0. So, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤) is concave in 𝑤. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤)
𝑑𝑤
= 0, we get [2𝛼 −
(𝛽 − γ)(2𝑤 + 𝑚1 + 𝑚2)] − 2(𝛽 − γ)(𝑤 − 𝑐) = 0 , that is, [2𝛼 − (𝛽 − γ)(𝑝1 + 𝑝2)] −
2(𝛽 − γ)(𝑤 − 𝑐) = 0. Then, we get 𝑤 = 𝑐 −
𝑝1+𝑝2
2
+
𝛼
𝛽−𝛾
. Replace 𝑤 = 𝑐 −
𝑝1+𝑝2
2
+
𝛼
𝛽−𝛾
 to 
(3.4), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝2
=
𝛼(5𝛽−3𝛾)
2(𝛽−𝛾)
+ 𝛽(𝑐 − 3𝑝2) −
(𝛽−3𝛾)𝑝1
2
 and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝22
= −3𝛽 < 0 . So, 
𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2) is concave in 𝑝2. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2)
𝑑𝑝2
= 0, we get 𝑝2 =
𝛼(5𝛽−3𝛾)+2𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐−(𝛽2−4𝛽𝛾+3𝛾2)𝑝1
6𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)
. 
Replace 𝑤 = 𝑐 −
𝑝1+𝑝2
2
+
𝛼
𝛽−𝛾
 and 𝑝2 =
𝛼(5𝛽−3𝛾)+2𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐−(𝛽2−4𝛽𝛾+3𝛾2)𝑝1
6𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)
 to (3.3), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝1
=
𝛼(72𝛽3+13𝛽2𝛾−36𝛽𝛾2−9𝛾3)
36𝛽2(𝛽−𝛾)
+
2𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)(15𝛽2+11𝛽𝛾−6𝛾2)𝑐
36𝛽2(𝛽−𝛾)
−
(𝛽−𝛾)(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)𝑝1
36𝛽2(𝛽−𝛾)
 
and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝12
= −
(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
36𝛽2
< 0. So, 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1) is concave in 𝑝1. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝑑𝑝1
= 0, 
we get 𝑝1
𝑟𝑠 =
𝛼(72𝛽3+13𝛽2𝛾−36𝛽𝛾2−9𝛾3)
(𝛽−𝛾)(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
+
2𝛽(15𝛽2+11𝛽𝛾−6𝛾2)𝑐
(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
. Replace 𝑝1
𝑟𝑠  to 𝑝2 =
𝛼(5𝛽−3𝛾)+2𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐−(𝛽2−4𝛽𝛾+3𝛾2)𝑝1
6𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)
, we get 𝑝2
𝑟𝑠 =
𝛼𝛽(73𝛽2+12𝛽𝛾−45𝛾2)
(𝛽−𝛾)(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
+
(29𝛽3+23𝛽2𝛾−3𝛽𝛾2−9𝛾3)𝑐
(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
. Replace 𝑝1
𝑟𝑠  and 𝑝2
𝑟𝑠  to 𝑤 = 𝑐 −
𝑝1+𝑝2
2
+
𝛼
𝛽−𝛾
, we get 𝑤𝑟𝑠 =
𝛼(59𝛽3+45𝛽2𝛾−15𝛽𝛾2−9𝛾3)
2(𝛽−𝛾)(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
+
(145𝛽3+25𝛽2𝛾−81𝛽𝛾2−9𝛾3)𝑐
2(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
. Then, we get 𝑞1
𝑟𝑠 =
(5𝛽+3𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
17𝛽+3𝛾
 
and 𝑞2
𝑟𝑠 =
𝛽(29𝛽2+22𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
.  
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Proposition 1 proof: From lemma 1, we get 𝑤𝑚𝑛 − 𝑤𝑛 =
𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐
6𝛽−2𝛾
. Since 𝑤 > 𝑐, then from 
lemma 1 we get 𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐 > 0. So, 𝑤𝑚𝑛 > 𝑤𝑛. Similarly, from lemma 1, we get 𝑤𝑛 −
𝑤𝑟𝑛 =
𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(7𝛽−3𝛾)(3𝛽−𝛾)
> 0, that is, 𝑤𝑛 > 𝑤𝑟𝑛. So, 𝑤𝑚𝑛 > 𝑤𝑛 > 𝑤𝑟𝑛. From lemma 1, we get 
𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑛 − 𝑝𝑖
𝑟𝑛 =
𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
2(7𝛽−3𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)
> 0, that is, 𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑛 > 𝑝𝑖
𝑟𝑛. Similarly, from lemma 1, we get 𝑝𝑖
𝑛 −
𝑝𝑖
𝑟𝑛 = −
𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(7𝛽−3𝛾)(3𝛽−𝛾)
< 0, that is, 𝑝𝑖
𝑟𝑛 > 𝑝𝑖
𝑛. So, 𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑛 > 𝑝𝑖
𝑟𝑛 > 𝑝𝑖
𝑛. From lemma 1, we get 
𝑞𝑖
𝑚𝑛 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑟𝑛 = −𝛽[𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐]
𝛽−𝛾
2(2𝛽−𝛾)(3𝛽−𝛾)
< 0 , that is, 𝑞𝑖
𝑚𝑛 < 𝑞𝑖
𝑟𝑛 . Similarly, from 
lemma 1, we get 𝑞𝑖
𝑟𝑛 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑛 = −𝛽[𝛼 − (𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑐]
𝛽−𝛾
(7𝛽−3𝛾)(3𝛽−𝛾)
< 0, that is, 𝑞𝑖
𝑟𝑛 < 𝑞𝑖
𝑛. So, 
𝑞𝑖
𝑛 > 𝑞𝑖
𝑟𝑛 > 𝑞𝑖
𝑚𝑛.  
 
Proposition 2 proof: From lemma 1 and (3.1), we get 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚𝑛) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) =
𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
2(2𝛽−𝛾)(3𝛽−𝛾)2
> 0, that is, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚𝑛) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛). Similarly, from lemma 1 and (3.1), we 
get 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟𝑛) =
2𝛽2(13𝛽−5𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
(7𝛽−3𝛾)2(3𝛽−𝛾)2
> 0 , that is, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟𝑛) . So, 
𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚𝑛) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟𝑛). From lemma 1, (3.3) and (3.4), we get 𝜋𝑟𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑛) −
𝜋𝑟𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑛) = −
𝛽(7𝛽−3𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
4[(3𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)]2
< 0 , that is, 𝜋𝑟𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑛) >  𝜋𝑟𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑛) . Similarly, from 
lemma 1, (3.3) and (3.4), we get 𝜋𝑟𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑣) − 𝜋𝑟𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑟𝑣) = −
𝛽(5𝛽2+6𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
(7𝛽−3𝛾)2(3𝛽−𝛾)2
< 0, that 
is, 𝜋𝑟𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑟𝑣) > 𝜋𝑟𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑣). So, 𝜋𝑟𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑟𝑣) > 𝜋𝑟𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑣) > 𝜋𝑟𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑣). From lemma 1, (3.1), (3.3) and 
(3.4), we get 𝜋𝑠
𝑛 − 𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑛 =
2𝛽(8𝛽−3𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
[(7𝛽−3𝛾)(3𝛽−𝛾)]2
> 0, that is, 𝜋𝑠
𝑛 > 𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑛. Similarly, from 
lemma 1, (3.1), (3.3) and (3.4), we get 𝜋𝑠
𝑚𝑛 − 𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑛 = −
𝛽(13𝛽−6𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
2[(7𝛽−3𝛾)(2𝛽−𝛾)]2
< 0, that is, 
𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑛 > 𝜋𝑠
𝑚𝑛. So, 𝜋𝑠
𝑛 > 𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑛 > 𝜋𝑠
𝑚𝑛.  
 
Proposition 3 proof: (1) From lemma 1, we get 𝑤𝑚𝑛 − 𝑤𝑚𝑠 =
𝛼
2(𝛽−𝛾)
+
𝑐
2
− [
𝛼
2(𝛽−𝛾)
+
𝑐
2
] =
0, that is, 𝑤𝑚𝑛 = 𝑤𝑚𝑠. From lemma 1, we get 𝑝1
𝑚𝑛 − 𝑝1
𝑚𝑠 = −
𝛾2[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
4(2𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
< 0, that is, 
𝑝1
𝑚𝑛 < 𝑝1
𝑚𝑠. From lemma 1, we get 𝑝2
𝑚𝑛 − 𝑝2
𝑚𝑠 = −
𝛾3[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
8𝛽(2𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
< 0, that is, 𝑝2
𝑚𝑛 <
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𝑝2
𝑚𝑠. From lemma 1, we get 𝑝1
𝑚𝑠 − 𝑝2
𝑚𝑠 =
𝛾2[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
8𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
> 0, that is, 𝑝1
𝑚𝑠 > 𝑝2
𝑚𝑠. So 𝑝1
𝑚𝑠 >
𝑝2
𝑚𝑠 > 𝑝2
𝑚𝑛 = 𝑝1
𝑚𝑛.  
(2) From lemma 1, we get 𝑤𝑟𝑛 − 𝑤𝑟𝑠 = −
(𝛽−3𝛾)(𝛽+3𝛾)(5𝛽+3𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
2(7𝛽−3𝛾)(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
, 𝑝1
𝑟𝑛 − 𝑝1
𝑟𝑠 =
6𝛽(𝛽−3𝛾)(𝛽+3𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(7𝛽−3𝛾)(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
, 𝑝2
𝑟𝑛 − 𝑝2
𝑟𝑠 = −
(𝛽−3𝛾)2(𝛽+3𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(7𝛽−3𝛾)(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
, and 𝑝1
𝑟𝑠 − 𝑝2
𝑟𝑠 =
−
(𝛽−3𝛾)(𝛽+3𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
. So, if 𝛽 = 3𝛾, then 𝑤𝑟𝑛 = 𝑤𝑟𝑠, 𝑝1
𝑟𝑠 = 𝑝1
𝑟𝑛 = 𝑝2
𝑟𝑛 = 𝑝2
𝑟𝑠; if 𝛽 >
3𝛾, then 𝑤𝑟𝑛 < 𝑤𝑟𝑠 , 𝑝1
𝑟𝑠 < 𝑝1
𝑟𝑛 = 𝑝2
𝑟𝑛 < 𝑝2
𝑟𝑠 ; if 𝛽 < 3𝛾 , then 𝑤𝑟𝑛 > 𝑤𝑟𝑠 , 𝑝1
𝑟𝑛 = 𝑝2
𝑟𝑛 <
𝑝2
𝑟𝑠 < 𝑝1
𝑟𝑠.  
 
Proposition 4 proof: (1) From lemma 1 and (3.1), we get 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚𝑛) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚𝑠) =
𝛾2(2𝛽+𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
16𝛽(2𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
> 0, that is, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚𝑛) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚𝑠). From lemma 1 and (3.3), we get 
𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑚𝑛) − 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑚𝑠) = −
𝛾4[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
32𝛽(2𝛽−𝛾)2(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
< 0 , that is, 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑚𝑛) < 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑚𝑠) . From 
lemma 1, and (3.4), we get 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑚𝑛) − 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑚𝑠) = −
(16𝛽3𝛾3−8𝛽𝛾5+𝛾6)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
64𝛽(2𝛽−𝛾)2(2𝛽2−𝛾2)2
< 0, that 
is, 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑚𝑛) < 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑚𝑠). From lemma 1, (3.3) and (3.4), we get 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑚𝑛) = 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑚𝑛), 
and 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑚𝑠) − 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑚𝑠) = −
𝛾3(4𝛽+3𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
64𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)2
< 0 , that is, 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑚𝑠) < 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑚𝑠) . 
Then 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑚𝑛) = 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑚𝑛) < 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑚𝑠) < 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑚𝑠). From lemma 1, (3.1), (3.3) and (3.4), 
we get 𝜋𝑠
𝑚𝑛 − 𝜋𝑠
𝑚𝑠 =
𝛾2{[12𝛽(𝛽2−𝛾2)+4(𝛽3−𝛾3)+16𝛽2(𝛽+𝛾)](𝛽−𝛾)+𝛾4}[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
64𝛽(2𝛽−𝛾)2(2𝛽2−𝛾2)2
> 0 , that is, 
𝜋𝑠
𝑚𝑛 > 𝜋𝑠
𝑚𝑠.  
(2) From lemma 1 and (3.1), we get 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟𝑛) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟𝑠) = −(𝛽 − 3𝛾)(𝛽 + 3𝛾)(5𝛽 +
3𝛾)
(821𝛽4+278𝛽3𝛾−432𝛽2𝛾2−54𝛽𝛾3+27𝛾4)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
2(7𝛽−3𝛾)2(17𝛽+3𝛾)2(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)2
. From lemma 1 and (3.3), we get 
𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑟𝑛) − 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑟𝑠) = −
(𝛽−3𝛾)2(𝛽+3𝛾)2[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
2(7𝛽−3𝛾)2(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
. From lemma 1 and (3.4), we get 
𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑟𝑛) − 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑟𝑠) =
3𝛽(𝛽−3𝛾)(𝛽+3𝛾)2(407𝛽3+137𝛽2𝛾−183𝛽𝛾2−9𝛾3)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
2(7𝛽−3𝛾)2(17𝛽+3𝛾)2(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)2
. From lemma 1, 
(3.1), (3.3) and (3.4), we get 𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑛 − 𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑠 = −
(𝛽−3𝛾)(𝛽+3𝛾)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]2
(7𝛽−3𝛾)2(17𝛽+3𝛾)2(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)2
{[88𝛽2(𝛽2 −
𝛾2) + 196𝛽(𝛽3 − 𝛾3) + 5𝛽4 + 1400𝛽3𝛾 + 1204𝛽4](𝛽 − 𝛾) + 47𝛽𝛾4 + 81𝛾5}. So, if 𝛽 =
3𝛾 , then 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟𝑛) = 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟𝑠) , 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑟𝑛) = 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑟𝑠) , 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑟𝑛) = 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑟𝑠)  and 𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑛 =
𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑠 ; if 𝛽 > 3𝛾 , then 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟𝑛) < 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟𝑠), 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑟𝑛) < 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑟𝑠), 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑟𝑛) > 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑟𝑠), 
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and 𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑛 < 𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑠 ; if 𝛽 < 3𝛾 , 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟𝑛) > 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟𝑠) , 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑟𝑛) < 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑟𝑠) , 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑟𝑛) <
𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑟𝑠), and 𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑛 > 𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑠.  
 
Proposition 5 proof: (1) From lemma 1, we get 
𝑑𝑤𝑚𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
1
2(𝛽−𝛾)
> 0, 
𝑑𝑤𝑚𝑠
𝑑𝛼
=
1
2(𝛽−𝛾)
> 0, 
𝑑𝑤𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
𝛽
(3𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑤𝑟𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
2𝛽
(7𝛽−3𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑤𝑟𝑠
𝑑𝛼
=
𝛼()59𝛽3+45𝛽2𝛾−15𝛽𝛾2−9𝛾3
2(𝛽−𝛾)(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
> 0 ; 
𝑑𝑝1
𝑚𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
3𝛽−2𝛾
2(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑝1
𝑚𝑠
𝑑𝛼
=
6𝛽2−𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2
4(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑝1
𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
2𝛽−𝛾
(3𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑝1
𝑟𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
5𝛽−3𝛾
(7𝛽−3𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑝1
𝑟𝑠
𝑑𝛼
=
72𝛽3+13𝛽2𝛾−36𝛽𝛾2−9𝛾3
(𝛽−𝛾)(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
> 0 ; 
𝑑𝑞1
𝑚𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
𝛽
2(2𝛽−𝛾)
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑞1
𝑚𝑠
𝑑𝛼
=
2𝛽+𝛾
8𝛽
> 0, 
𝑑𝑞1
𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
𝛽
3𝛽−𝛾
> 0, 
𝑑𝑞1
𝑟𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
2𝛽
7𝛽−3𝛾
> 0, 
𝑑𝑞1
𝑟𝑠
𝑑𝛼
=
5𝛽+3𝛾
17𝛽+3𝛾
> 0; 
𝑑𝑝2
𝑚𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
3𝛽−2𝛾
2(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
> 0, 
𝑑𝑝2
𝑚𝑠
𝑑𝛼
=
12𝛽3−2𝛽2𝛾−7𝛽𝛾2+𝛾3
8𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑝2
𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
2𝛽−𝛾
(3𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑝2
𝑟𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
5𝛽−3𝛾
(7𝛽−3𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑝2
𝑟𝑠
𝑑𝛼
=
𝛽(73𝛽2+12𝛽𝛾−45𝛾2)
(𝛽−𝛾)(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
> 0; 
𝑑𝑞2
𝑚𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
𝛽
2(2𝛽−𝛾)
> 0, 
𝑑𝑞2
𝑚𝑠
𝑑𝛼
=
4𝛽2+2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2
8(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
> 0, 
𝑑𝑞2
𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
𝛽
3𝛽−𝛾
>
0, 
𝑑𝑞2
𝑟𝑛
𝑑𝛼
=
2𝛽
7𝛽−3𝛾
> 0, 
𝑑𝑞2
𝑟𝑠
𝑑𝛼
=
𝛽(29𝛽2+22𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
> 0. So, 𝑤𝑖, 𝑝1
𝑖 , 𝑞1
𝑖 , 𝑝2
𝑖  and 𝑞2
𝑖  are all 
increase in 𝛼, where 𝑖 = 𝑚𝑛, 𝑚𝑠, 𝑛, 𝑟𝑛, 𝑟𝑠. 
(2) From lemma 1 and (3.1), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚𝑛)
𝑑𝛼
=
𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(2𝛽−𝛾)(𝛽−𝛾)
> 0 , 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑚𝑠)
𝑑𝛼
=
(8𝛽3+4𝛽2𝛾−3𝛽𝛾2−𝛾3)[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
8𝛽(𝛽−𝛾)(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
> 0 , 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛)
𝑑𝛼
=
4𝛽2[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(𝛽−𝛾)(3𝛽−𝛾)2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟𝑛)
𝑑𝛼
=
16𝛽2[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(𝛽−𝛾)(7𝛽−3𝛾)2
> 0, 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑟𝑠)
𝑑𝛼
=
(59𝛽3+45𝛽2𝛾−15𝛽𝛾2−9𝛾3)
2
[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(𝛽−𝛾)(17𝛽+3𝛾)2(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)2
> 0. From lemma 1 and 
(3.3), we get 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑚𝑛)
𝑑𝛼
=
𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
2(2𝛽−𝛾)2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑚𝑠)
𝑑𝛼
=
(2𝛽+𝛾)2[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
16𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
> 0 , 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑛)
𝑑𝛼
=
2𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(3𝛽−𝛾)2
> 0, 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑟𝑛)
𝑑𝛼
=
12𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(7𝛽−3𝛾)2
> 0, 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑟𝑠)
𝑑𝛼
=
(5𝛽+3𝛾)2[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(17𝛽+3𝛾)(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
> 0. From 
lemma 1 and (3.4), we get  
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑚𝑛)
𝑑𝛼
=
𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
2(2𝛽−𝛾)2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑚𝑠)
𝑑𝛼
=
(4𝛽2+2𝛽𝛾−𝛾2)
2
[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
32𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑛)
𝑑𝛼
=
2𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(3𝛽−𝛾)2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑟𝑛)
𝑑𝛼
=
12𝛽[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(7𝛽−3𝛾)2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑟𝑠)
𝑑𝛼
=
3𝛽(29𝛽2+22𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)
2
[𝛼−(𝛽−𝛾)𝑐]
(17𝛽+3𝛾)2(6𝛽2+𝛽𝛾−3𝛾2)2
> 0. Then 
𝑑𝜋𝑠
𝑚𝑛
𝑑𝛼
> 0, 
𝑑𝜋𝑠
𝑚𝑠
𝑑𝛼
> 0, 
𝑑𝜋𝑠
𝑛
𝑑𝛼
> 0, 
𝑑𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑛
𝑑𝛼
> 0, 
𝑑𝜋𝑠
𝑟𝑠
𝑑𝛼
> 0 . So, 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑖) , 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
𝑖 ) , 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝2
𝑖 )  and 𝜋𝑠
𝑖  are all increase in 𝛼 , where 𝑖 =
𝑚𝑛, 𝑚𝑠, 𝑛, 𝑟𝑛, 𝑟𝑠. 
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